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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ALICE

Loos,

Plaintiff and Respondent J
vs.
Mo"LXTAI~
PANY,

FuEL

SuPPLY

a corporation, and

MoTOR

PARK,

CoM-

Oase No. 6211

UTAH

INcORPORATED,

a

corporation,
Defendavn~ts

and Appellants.

Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Motor Park, Incorporated

There are two things which ·prompt this appellant to
file a reply: First, that in some particulars respondent
ihas forgotten the facts and issues; and second, that counsel for re·spondent seems to have imagined certain facts
to have ·been established by the evidence in applying the
law.
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FACTS AND IBSUES.
On page two of respondent'·s brief is the following
statement:

"It is admitted by the respondent that the
appellant F'uel Supply Company, hereinafter referred to as Gas Company, supplied natural gas
to the M-otor Park and the M1otor Park to its furnished cottages, including that occupied by respondent at the time of the accident.''
Counsel for respondent certainly 1had a lapse of
memory when he made that statement out of thin air.
Nowhere in either the allegat1ons or the evidence is there
an allegation or admission that the Motor Park furnished
gas to its cottages.
Paragraph two of the amended )complaint expressly
alleges that the defendant Gas Company was supplying
the gas to the defendant Motor Park and to the individual
cottages by means of pipe laid underground from its
source ·Of supply and by means of connections leading
from its system of pipes to the heating and ·cooking facilities in the apartments maintained by the Motor Park
for use of the tenants of the Motor Park.
Paragraph three alleges that the Motor Park operates its apartments which were supplied with gas from
the system of pipes fDom the defendant Mountain Fuel
Supply Company. (Ab. 3-4)
These allegations were admitted by the defendant
Motor Park (Ab. 14-15). The only evidence on the subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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jert was g-iven by the \Yitness Lindholm, who testified
(~-\..h. 66) to the effect that the Utah Motor Park had
nothing to do with the regulatiron of the ,supply of gas
to the Park. ....\side from these allegations, admissions,
and that one statement by ~lr. Lindholm, the subjeet
matter \Yas never Inentioned.
On page 11 is the following: ''That the pipes and
connections ·were not inspected by either defendant, but
{)n the contrary the duty of reporting leaks was left to
tenants, is established and is not in dispute.''
\\There counsel could have found a basis for that
statement is certainly a. mystery.
~-\..nd

on page 14, speaking .of the Gas Company, counsel says: ''But it also knew that the .Motor Park made n.o
inspection rbut merely reported it when the ,odor of gas
became so offensive to tenants that they n1a.de complaint
of it."
And again on page 23 is the following, speaking of
the Motor Park: ''Its manager testified in the case that
when complaint was made of the rodor of gas it made no
investigation but ealled the Gas Company and left to it
the duty of locating the leak and repairing it."
Undoubtedly we could safely rely upon this court to
read the record and decide tihe case upon the

f~acts

es-

tablished' by the evidence, but in the face of such glaring
misstatements we feel constrained to aga1n call the
~court's

attention to the evidence upon these subjects,
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,since they are all more or less related and refer to the
same proposition.
Mr. Lindholm testified (Ab. 48-49) in answer toquestions by counsel for pla.intiff, that when an odor of gas
was reported the :Motor Park would in most instances
make an investigation by going over to see if they could
take care of it themselves, but if someone said tihere was
a ba:d odor of gas they would call the Gas Company immediately. Again under cross-examination of cownsel for
plaintiff (Ab. 69-70-71) Mr. L~ndholm was asked the question if there was anybody whose duty it was to investigate and find out what was wrong when gas was leaking,
and he answered that he always sent Mr. Sheets, assistant manager, or investigated it himself, and that in fa.ct
all tihe employees had instructions if there were any leaks
to make a report to the office, and we would check and
find out, and if there were gas leaks the Motor Park reported to the Gas Company, ''always called the Gas Company'', and after the repairs were made the Motor Park
always checked up to find out if it was repaired. The gas
man didn't leave until it was repaired. He would require
the Motor Park to sign a small slip showing that the repair had been made, and that tihe Motor Park, by Mr.
Lindholm personally or by employees, always n1ade an
inve,stigatiton to find out if the repairs were satisfactory,
and also ''in going through cottages he observed the odor
of gas at times when it had not ibeen reported". Reports
of odor of gas were made mtore frequently than odors
were found by investigation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5
Tenants were ,shown the ~cottages by an employee of
the Motor Park before they were rented, as was done with
Mr. and ~Irs. Loos. If tihere was anything wrong with
the ·cottage, or if there was a gas odor in the cottage, it
would be observed at the time. At that time the heating
apparatus was tested and the tenant was shown how to
operate it.
)lr. Sheets testified (Ab. 57) that when the odor of
gas was reported the Park employees would go and see
if there were a gas leak, and if uhere were they would
notify the gas company, and (Ab. 58) that they were always on the lookout for anything as they worked around
the court.
The Motor Park employed a. housekeeper and maids
(Ab. 61-63). It was the duty iOf the maids to ·see that the
cottages were kept elean, and it was the duty of the
!housekeeper to see that everything was run correctly,
to see that the ma~ds did their work, and to take care
of a.ny ·complaints. So far as week to week tenants or
monthly tenants were concerned, it was the maid's duty
when pe1ople moved out to dean the cabins, make the beds,
clean the floors and bathroom and the wash basin, and
so far as Mr. and Mrs. Loos were concerned to go once
a week to the Loos 1cottage to give them clean linen, and
the head !housekeeper was in the Loos cottage about two
o'clock on the afternoon .of the accident.
In addition the Motor Park utilized the services of
the Gas Company to the very utmost in investigating and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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che.eking for leaks and in seeing that they were repaired.
The·Gas Company hired experts in the matter of handling
gas and dete·eting and repairing leaks. It was their busines·s. As befiore stated, the Motor Park was a customer
or consumer. It did. not pretend to be an expert in the
handling of gas any more than Mr. and Mrs. Loos or any
other customer in Salt Lake City or elsewhere. It was
only natural that it should go to the Gas Company for
this clas-s ·Of .service, and it had a right to assume that
when the Has Company reported that the repairs were
made that such was the fact, and it boo the right to assume that if there was anything wrong with the situation
down there that the Gas Company would know it and see
that it was corrected.
Oounsel for plaintiff makes much of the fact that
both Mr. Lindholm and Mr. Sheets testified that they relied upon tenants to make complaints of gas odors if
there were any.
This was not, as stated by counsel for plaintiff, the
exclusive ·Source of information. It was, however, only
natural that the tenants or occupants ·should ibe the main
source of information. They were occupying the pr·emi·ses to the exclusion of the Motor Park. This was particularly true of month to month tenants and week to week
tenants. Employees of the Motor Park had no more
right to g10 into the cottages than an apartment house
owner would have to go into the apartments of his tenants. The tenant wa·s operating the appliances and occupying the premises to the exclusion of the Motor Park
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employees. This was the m1ost natural source for the
Motor Park officials to look to for ,complaints.
Counsel for plaintiff states ·On page 11 "that there
was not sufficient ventilation t~o prevent accumulation
of gas in dangerous quantities may also be inferred from
what happened there". Certainly it is evident that the
gas which came into the cottage by a ·sudden gush at the
time of the explosion could not eseape. This is no evidence of the fact that the eottages were not properly and
sufficiently ventilated for ordinary purposes. The Motor
Park ·was bound to use only ordimary care and to provide for ordinary events. There was no duty up1on the
Motor Park to provide ventilation to take care of extraordinary events. Otherwise it would be impossible
to either construct 10T maintain a house, residence, fwc~
tory or other structure. All gas pipes are laid in the
ground or within partition walls, in basements, or in
conduits. If the owners of premises were required to
provide sufficient ventilation at each spot in their premises to take care of a sudden gush of gas which might occur by reason of some unforeseen and unforseea:ble incident there could be no such thing as modern building.
If the vents which were provided were insufficient to take
care of ordinary events and to take care of any natural
or probable leaks and to provide for the

es~cape

of fumes

which in the ordinary and usual operation of premises
might ,occur, then it seems to us that it would have been
possible for plaintiff to provide that evidence through
the ·calling of any builder or heating engineer.
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'Throughout respondent's brief it is assumed that
there is evidence in the case to the effe-ct that this explosion occurred in a portion of the premise.s under the
e~clusive control of defendant M.otor Park. It is also
a·ssumed throughout the brief that ther~e is evidence in
the case to the effect that the pipes and connections within ,or beneath the Loos cottage were leaking prior to the
time of the a1ccident and that the explosion occurred iby
reason of a leak beneath the Loos cottage. T1here is no
such evidence and such assumptions are in error. We
shall discuss this in connection with the particular points
inv,olved.
POINT I.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE CASE
TO THE JURY AS AGAINST DIDFENDANT MOTOR PARK?

It will be observed:
1. That plaintiff does not pretend to have presented
any evidence of the structural defect alleged in paragra·pihs 4, 5, and 6 of the amended ·complaint.
2.. That plaintiff failed to establish by any evidence
the allegation that def.endant Motor Park failed to make
inspection of its premises, but on the contrary the uncontradicted evi·dence shows that it was vigilant and
made frequent and 'continuous inspections, and this notwithstanding the fact that this court in the case of Hatsis

v. Uwited States Fuel Company, 82 Utah 38, held that
there is no liability upon a lHndlord for failure to inspect
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and discover hidden da.ng·er.s, and that there is no duty
on the landlord to discover and apprise the tenant of
bidden or unk.n·own defects, if any.
3. Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to the
effect that the ventilat1on provided beneath the cottage
was insufficient.
Counsel for respondent seems to feel, however, that
this lack of evidence is cured and the deficient evidence
supplied bee.a.use defendants objected to the cross-examination of Mr. Lindholm as to the cause of t1he accident
and because the court refused to compel Mr. Slusser of
the P.ublic Service Commission to testify, and because
counsel assumes that defendants had information in their
pos·session as to the cause of the explosion, which they
failed to produce.
As to the witness Lindholm, respondent called him
as a witness as part of respondent's case, and examined
him at length upon the issues ·Of the case (Ab. 43--50).
Mr. Lindholm was not asked one question at that time
as to the cause of the explosion, the ~construction of the
cottage, or what, if any, structural defects there were
within the cottages as alleged in the complaint. Counsel
for respondent had ample opportunity at that time to ask
Mr. Lindholm any question which he desired to do. He
failed to do so and failed to ask any other witness any
question upon that ·subject matter. Subsequently, when
Mr. Lindholm was called as a witness for defendants (Ab.
64-69) he wa.s interrogated upon other subjects upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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direct examination. Counsel for respondent then s~ought
iby cross-examination to ask Mr. Lindholm the question
(Ab. 73), "You haven't any information now as to how
this accident happened~", t,o, wihich objeetion was made
upon the ground that it was improper cross-examination
and which objection was sustained. No appeal is taken
from that ruling of the eourt but ·counsel would now attempt to take advantage ,of tna t to raise a presumption
that the defendant Motor Park was concealing something. Not only was it improper cross-examination but
the question called for hearsay and speculation upon the
part of Mr. Lindholm. It was uncontradicted that Mr.
Lindholm was not here when the accident occurred and
had not been for .some time before, and did not return
to Salt Lake City for weeks after the accident.
-counsel for respondent ·s·erved a demand (Ab. 50-51)
that they be allowed to inspect the premises and certain
pipes, unions and 'connections. While the dem·and to see
the apartment was somewhat peculiar in view of the fact
that it was destroyed, nevertheless counsel for respondent himself states (Ab. 51) that he was told that the pipes
were there and that he was welcome to ·see them. The
pipes were brought into, court but no one was called to
identify them, and no effort was made at all to present
them in evidence or to elicit any information with reference to them.
Respondent -called Mr. Slusser of the Public Servi·ce
Commission to testify. He appeared by counsel (Ab. 52)
and claimed the privilege and refused to testify under
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the pro,·isions of Seetion 104-49L3 (;)) and Section 764-16. In addition both defendants objected to the emnp.eteney of the evidence. ·The -court refused to con1pel
the \Yitness to testify.
The last pr,oYision of the statute requires the Public
SerTice Commission to investigate the cause of al1 a.ceidents occurring \\·ithin the .~tate resulting in loss of
life or injury to persons or property connected with any
pwblic utility, or directly or indirectly arising fftom the
maintenanee or operation of utilities. It provides further that neither the order nor recommendation of the
Commission, nor any accident report filed with the Commission shall be admitted as evidence in any action for
damages based upon or arising out of the loss of life or
injury to person ,or property referred to in the se,ction.
The other section of the statute provides that a public
officer .cannot be examined as to eommunica tions n1ade
to him in official confidence when the public interests
would suffer by the disc1osure.
Respondent failed to assign cross-errors in connection with this ruling of the court, and we respectfully
submit that under the authorities no presumption arises
either way from failure to produce ·such evidence.
The law required defendant Motor Park to give the
Public Service Commissioner a free hand in investigating this accident and required defendant to place at the
disposal of the Public Service ·Commissioner all evidenc•e
in its posses·sion, including the pipes, connections, and
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appliances within the cottages. Certainly defendant is
not to be prejudiced by t:his requirement of the law.
Plaintiff's husband was in Salt Lake City at the time .of
the accident and rue-cording to his own evidence remained
here for about five weeks. He had free access to the
premises where the accident occurred to make any investigation which he desired, either per.sonally or by repres·entative. He testified (Ab. 28) tha.t he made an examination of the premises. He certainly had all o.f the
opportunity which defendant·s had to make· any examination and investigation that he desired, and for such purpose he could have utilized an engineer had he so desired.
In fact he had greater opportunity than the defendant
Motor Park be-cause the manager o.f tihe Motor Park was
absent and did not return f:or weeks.
There may be some doulbt as to whether the privilege of the statute would have extended so as to preclude
the witness Slusser or some other witnes·s from the Public
Servi·ce Commission from identifying the pipes whi,ch
they took into their possession. For some reason best
known to counsel for respondent he preferred to stand
upon a supposed unfavorable presumption against defendants by reason of tihis ·situation than to make any
effort to have the pipes identified or to present competent
evidence upon the subject matter.
This cas·e therefore does not fall within the authorities cited by counsel to the effect that if a party to the
·suit fails to present evidence in its possession not available to the other party, an unfaV:orable presumption
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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anses therefrom. 'The evidence was equally available
and equally unavailable to all parties, and Mr. Slusser
equally disqualified as a witness to testify for or against
either party as to matters and things which he discovered
in his investigation, and the evidence was equally privileged as against all parties as to Mr. Slusser's conclusions or opinions.
Respondent cites 36 Corpus Juris, Section 887, page
212, to the effect that where a landlord leases separate
portions of the same property to different tenants but
reserves under his -control certain parts to· be used in
common by all tenants, that the landlord is under the
implied obligation to keep the part over which he reserves
control in repair; and that tJhis doctrine likewi·se applies
to that portion to which the tenants have no right of a~c
cess; and also to agencies, appliances and instrumentalities supplied by the landlord for the use of the several
tenants. Counsel also quotes a.t length a ·statement by
s·ome editor of A. L. R., found in 13 A. L. R. at page 837,
to the effect that a landlord is also responsible for the
maintenance of a plant or system installed for the benefit of all tenants regardle·ss of where it is located.
1

Tihe doctrine contended for by respondent is impliedly recognized by this court in the case of Wilson v.
W oo•druff, 65 Utah 118, but this court refused to apply
it in that ·case because plaintiff had failed to establish
by competent evidence that the accident occurred by reason of a. defect in a part of the building reserved by the
landlord. The fact is that such law ha.s no applicability
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in the -case at bar for tJhe same reason it was not applied
in the W-oodruff ease. Plaintiff failed to establish by
any evidence whats~oever the 1cause of the accident or
where the gas came from that exploded. Certainly, as
stated by plaintiff on page 11 of her brief, it is beyond
question that it was gas which e~ploded, but ·that does
not establish the fact tihat the gas came from a pipe
·beneath the building any more than it established that
the gas .came from ·One of the appliances within or beneath
the building. There were tw1o floor heaters beneath the
building in question, one operated by plaintiff and iher
husband and one operated by Wheelers. The evidence
was uncontradicted that both of these appliances were
under the control of the tenants. There were two gas
ranges within the building, one of which was under the
contr~ol

of plaintiff and her husband and the other of

which was under the control of the Wheelers. Certainly
those appliances and the pipes and conne1ctions in connection ·therewith were not under the control of defendant Motor Park but were under the control of the tenants,
and the defendant Motor Park was dependent entirely
upon those tenants for information as to their condition.
Until, therefore, plaintiff had first established by
some competent evidence the cause of the explosion and
the ·source of the gas which caused the explosion, the
law contended for has no applicability.

That such

evidence might have to be more ·or less circumstantial
and perhaps even dependent upon the opinion of an
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expert does not do away with the necessity for its production.
Xor are the authorities listed in the three A. L. R.
annotations cited by counsel for respondent to the contrary. A reading· of those cases shows that in each
instance where the landlord has been held liable, the
thing which caused the injury was identified and shown
by competent evidence to have been under the landlord's
control, regardless of its location upon the premises.
In the case of Grobrecht v. Beckwith, (New Hamp.)
52 A. L. R. 858, a gas water heater was in a bathroom
over which the landlord retained control.
The farthest that any court has ever gone in holding
a landlord liable is the case of W ardman v. Hanlon,
26 A. L. R. 1249, immediately preceding the notes cited
by counsel for respondent. There the landlord had
exclusive control over the pipes leading to the bathroom
facilities in the apartment house. He had exclusive
control over the hot water facilities within the apartment house. The tenant had no control over those facilities. There was not even a dispute upon those facts
in that case. The landlord was held liable and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held to apply because of
the fact that the landlord had absolute control over those
facilities. Certainly the same doctrine would not have
applied had the hot water heater in question been within
the apartment and operated by the tenant.
tinction is plainly evident.

The dis-

In the case at bar, on the

other hand, the landlord had nothing to do with the
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supply of gas into the premises and no control over it,
had nothing to do with the operation of the appliances
within and under the cottage, and plaintiff produced no
evidence whatsoever as to the source of the gas which
caused the explosion.
With these distinguishing features in mind we join
with respondent in inviting the court's attention to the
cases annotated in thos-e three volumes of A. L. R.
On page 12 of respondent's brief counsel quotes
86 C. J., Section 899, page 217, to the effect that t:he landlord is liable for his failure to prevent the ·escape of gas
fr·om pipes in such quantities as to be dangerous to a tenant. Counsel fails to call the attention of the court, ho:wever, to the fact that this statement is a sub-heading under
Seetion '' B '' at page 212, under the main heading,
''Where portions of property not demised or agencies and
appliances are retained in contr·ol of the landlord" A reference to the eases cited to support that statement shows
that in each instance it was a .cas·e where gas esicaped from
an appliance wnder the control of the landlord. The
quotation given by counsel for respondent standing alone
would be ridiculous in the extreme unless applied within
the limitations of the general rule stated above. A landlord certainly is no guarantor that ga:s will not escape
from pipes where the appliances, facilities and even
the pipes are within premises demised to the tenant.
The landloro is entirly dependent upon the tenant under
those circumstances, and the authorities which we have
submitted hold that the landlord cannot be liable under
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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those conditions. This quotation is art apt illustration
of how a quotation of that kind may be· misunderstood
and misapplied when dis..asociated from its place in
the legal picture, and yet how perfectly correct when
roupled with the subject matter to which it is related.
Counsel has gone t·o great lengths in quoting from
the evidence of illr. Lindholm, William Dawson, Harvey
B. Bussell, Rosa Louise Bussell, Clara Tissot and John
Swager to show that there were gas odors on occasions
in the Mot·or Park. From this evidence he draws the
conclusion that the pipes and connections at the Motor
Park were in bad condition and that on two specific
occasions during the twenty days immediately before
the explosion the Motor Park failed to take action to
remedy a condition in the immediate vicinity of the
Loos cottage.
As heretofore stated, the defendant Motor Park
did not deny that there were gas odors in and about
the cottages. It adiDitted that there were o-ccasions when
odors were frequent. There were 113 cottages equipped
with gas burners and heating appliances. There were
occasions when, from natural wear and tear, a connection
would become loose. Also through operation of appliances by tenants pilot lights would become extinguished
tand there would be an odor of gas. As testified by Mr.
Lindholm any place where ga.s is used there is bound
to :be an occasional odor. It is very ·offensive and a. little
of it goes a long way. However, gas is nothing to be
trifled with and the Motor Park always called the' gas
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company whenever they were notified ·of a leak of any
kind.
William Dawson testified. that while he observed the
odor of gas in his own apartment tha.t. it was fued and
he never complained to the Motor Park management
thereafter.
Clara Tissot complained of the ·odor of gas in her
apartment and it was fixed. She made no complaint to
the management thereafter.
John Swager observed the odor of gas in his cabin
but not outside. He never reported it to the ·officers
of the Motor Park; didn't know whether the odor came
from the appliances.
Mr. and Mrs. Bussell observed an odor of gas in
the driveway between their cottage and the Wheeler
cottage most ·Of the time between the second or third
of January and the tin1e of the explosion. She claimed
to have reported it to Mr. Sheets on or about the
second or third of January, at which time (Ab. 38-39)
a boy was sent to look at it and she did not know what
the officials of the l\1otor Park did about it. She also
claimed to have reported it again on or about the 17th
of January. Mrs. I vie Graham Adams testified that
on this occasion (the Sunday before the explosion) the
pilot light in the floor furnace had become extinguished
and was emitting an odor of gas. She testified that she
lighted the pilot light.
From this evidence counsel seeks to establish that
the defendant Motor Park failed to inspect the pipes
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and connections, that the pipes and connection were in
need of repair, and that the complaints by tenants were
not followed by prompt attention on these two specific
occasions during twenty days immediately before the
explosion.
~Irs.

Bussell claimed to have made these complaints
to ~lr. Sheets. "\Yhile ~lr. Sheets denied these conversations with ~Irs. Bussell, and while Mrs. Bussell admitted
on cross-examination that she had a financial interest
in making these statements when they were first made
bY" her, we must nevertheless for the purpose of this
appeal accept them as true. Regardles-s of whether she
made any complaint to Mr. Sheets or not it was established by her own evidence that as to the first incident
action was taken by the Motor Park to investigate the
situation, and in the second instance the cause of the
gas odor was definitely established and shown to have
been eliminated. Mr. Sheets testified (Ah. 56) that he
was near the Bussell and Wheeler cabins three or four
times a day, and Mrs. Adams, the housekeeper, was in
and about the Loos and Wheeler cottages on the very
day ·of the accident. There were other employees of the
Jlotor Park at the premi·ses. The cottages in question
are about 125 or 1'50 feet from tJhe office (Ab. 64). Mrs.
Bussell and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler and Mr.
and Mrs. Loos had ample opportunity to make complaint, and if one or even two complaints were not
sufficient to again complain, if there was a dangerous
condition in or about their premises. Mr. and Mrs. Loos
of course testified that there was no odor of gas in or
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about their .cottage, and the Wheelers were not called to
testify at all.
This .court will certainly take judicial notice of the
fact that gas is a highly inflammable substance. If there
was any leak in the pipe or connections beneath any of
these cottages prior to the time of the explosion, why
did the explosion not occur or some fire happen on or
between the second day of January and the 17th day
of January, when Mrs. Bussell claims to have observed
these odors of gas, and when she says they were particularly strong~ This accident occurred during the
winter-time. There were two floor furnaces and two
ranges in operation in the Loos-Wheeler cottage. If
gas was permeating these structures either within or
beneath them that gas would have ignited when the leak
first occurred. Even an appellate court may disregard
evidence shown to be improbable ·or· impossible in the
presence of established physical facts.
Certain it is that if there was a gas odor in the
garage between the Wheeler and Bussell cottages between the second of January and the 17th of January,
that gas did not come from the same souree as the gas
which caused the explosion. Mrs. Loos testified that
there was no odor of gas in her cottage just before the
explosion when she went into the !bathroom. When she
came out there wa.s a ·strong odor of gas a.nd an immediate explosion.

This leads to only one conclusion,

namely, that the gas which ·caused the explosion was
emitted in great quantities

~at

tJhe particular moment
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from some unidentified source-either a sudden break
or a turning on ·of an appliance. The gas so emitted
ignited and exploded immediately because it -came in
.such quantities that it could find no escape ~nd because
it e.ame immediately into contact with one or more of the
four pilot lights or a lighted appliance in the cottage.
Whether the explosion occurred beneath the floor, or
whether it was in the tCottage and also beneath the floor
is not shown.
While the s·ource of the gas which exploded was not
established by ·a~ny evidence, it was definitely shown that
the only possible souree·S of ignition were pilot lights
in the appliances or a lighted applianc;e within the cottages. The gas had to travel to the lights to become
ignited, and the first ignition had to be within the cottages themselves. This does not establish any particular
sourc-e of the gas which caused the explosion.
In connection with this evidence as to the presence
of gas odors on previous occasions and at other pla1ces
within the Park, we respectfully call the court's attention to the case of Mowers v. Municipal Gas Company
of Albany, 126 N. Y. 8. 1033. ·This wa.s an action against
a Gas ~Company for personal injury. Prior to the explosion plaintiff had smelled a strong odor of gas in his
apartment. Shortly thereafter an explosion occurred,
wrecking the room and injuring the plaintiff. It was
subsequently discovered that there was a break in the
gas main in the ·street and that ga·s had forced itself
alonothe main ·and along the service pipe into th!e
0
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apartment. Plaintiff sought to hold the gas company
liable upon the theory that its main in the street was
old, deteriorated, and that a break might reasonably
be expected, and that in fact the 1break had existed for
many months, the odor of gas being perc.eptible at
various times and more violent on parti,cular o·ccasions.
Plaintiff established by evidence that there were various
complaints to the gas company of the smell of gas by
the occupants ·of houses in the vicinity. Repairmen were
sent and the leak in most cases discovered, and after
repair·s were m1ade the smells ceased. The evidence of
gas odors a:t various places was even strong~r than was
attempted to be produced by plaintiff in the case at bar.
A judgment for the plaintiff Wlas reversed upon the
ground that such evidenc~ did not establish the fact that
those vari-ous and miscellaneous gas odors came from
the souDce which caused the explosion and that the evidence had flailed to establish that the break which did
occur and from which the gas actually came was known
to defendant a sufficient length of time in advance to
have permitted repair. It seems to us that this Clase is
upon all fours with the case at bar.
We also refer to the case of H'ammerschm.idt v.
Municipal Gas Company, 99 N. Y. S. 890, upon the ·same
subject matter.
This court has held in numerous ca·s·es that the fact
that a defendant may have been negligent in other matters or on other occasions does not justify a verdict.
The specific negligence alleged must be proved.
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X or ·would such evidence tend to esta1blish a general
condition of disrepair or deterioration in the condition
of the pipes. The most that can be said for such evidence is that it had a bearing upon an is·sue whicih was
alleged and presented as against the defendant gas
company only. It was alleged in the ~complaint that the
defendants continued to furnish gas after a condition
of disrepair or deterioration was known or should have
been known. That allegation in turn has to be read in
connection ''ith the further allegations of the complaint
that the gas company was furnishing the gas. Nowhere
is it alleged in the complaint that the Motor Park was
furnishing the gas, but on the other hand it is expressly
alleged that the gas was furnished by the gas company.
Such evidence -could not therefore, in the presence of
those allegations, be the basis of liability on the part of
the Motor Park which was furnishing no gas and which
was not even alleged to be furnishing ga·s.
If such allegation and ·evidence could be made the
basis of a finding of negligence upon the part of the
Motor Park, then we respectfully submit that under the
uncontradicted evidence the M·otor Park did all that it
. could do under the circumstances, namely, rcall the gas
company again and .again and as often as leaks were
reported to it. Certainly that was the natural source of
as·sistance for the Motor Park in such cases, and if there
W!as anything wrong the Motor Park was unaware ·of it.
If appliance leaks from natural wear and tear in an
establishment of this kind can be made the basis of
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liability a~ainst a landlord, then we respectfully submit
that the owner of an apartment house, hotel, or othe-r
establishment where gas i·s used becom.es a guarantor
and can be held liable, re~ardless ·of the suddenness or
unexpectedness of an event, by merely calling the various
tenants to testify that they smelled gas on several
ocea,sions. Such is not the law. An ample answer to
that contention is found in the authorities which we have
cited.
The difference between these wear and tear leaks
such as was described by the various witnesses who were
called to testify and the major emission of gas such as
caused the explosion in question in this case was reco:gniz·ed by the Wis{~onsin Supreme Court in the case of
Morrison v. Superior Water, Lig'ht <ffi Power Company,
114 N. W. 434, wherein the court denied liability upon
the basis of that character of evidence in attempting t·o
establish liability for an explosion, the Wisconsin .court
.stating that in the best of systems such leaks are bound
to occur and are not of themselves evidence of negligence.
We respectfully submit, therefore, that there is
nothing in the facts of this case, ·or in the law, to whi0h
counsel for respondent has directed attention which in
any way affect the applicability of authorities cited
by us under this point in our former brief, and we urge
on the basis of those authorities and the additional cases
cited herein that the trial ·court erred in refusing to
grant the motion for non-suit and directed verdict.
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But, says counsel for respondent, even though respondent might have failed to estalblish the cause of the
explosion, nevertheless the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is applicable and establishes negligence.
II.
DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAD NO
APPLICABILITY AS AGAINST DEFENDANT MOTOR PARK?

Respondent seems to have been unable to find any
case holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
under the uncontradicted :Baets ·of this case.
Assuming, as stated by respondent, that the doctrine
may apply even though partircular acts of negligence
be alleged, this does not make the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applicable in cases where it does not apply.
As is stated in the authorities cited by us, before
the doctrine can ever be applied the cause of the explosion (the source of the ga.s) must be definitely established. In the absence of such evidence how can the
doctrine ever be applied~
See Hubbert v. Aztec Brewing Company, (Oal.) 80
Pac. ( 2d) 185 and 1016, wherein the California court
refused to apply rthe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a
case where the cause of the explosion was unknown and
WJhere the source of ignition was under the control of
some agency other than the defendant. An excellent discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and its apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pli.cability in cases of this kind is set forrt:h in that case,
both upon original decision and after granting petition
for rehearing.
The case of Wright v. Southern Counties Gas Compavn.y, 283 Pac. 823, cited by respondent, is not in point,
nor is the ·ease of Van Horn. v. Pac. R. &' R. Co., 148
Pac. 951. In both of these cases the instrumentality
causing t1he injury was shown to have been under the
control o~ defendant and he sought to defend because
others might have had access to it. That is not our
case where two defendants are jointly charged, and the
evidence shows the gas to have been under the control
of the Gas Company and the appliances under the control
of neither defendant. The \Vright and Van Horn decisions were both by district courts ·of appeal of the State
of California, not by the Supreme Court of the State
of California. Subsequently these decisions wer·e considered and held inapplicable in the Hanneman and
Gerdes cases from the District Courts ·of Appeal of
California cited by us in our first brief, and the Supreme
Court of the State of California, in reversing the Gerdes
case upon other grounds, held that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur had no· applicaibility.
The Supreme Court of the .State of Colorado in the
case of Yellow Cab Company v. Hodson., 14 Pac. (2d)
1081, ·Considered the Wright case but held that the doctrine there announced was inapplicable in a case where
two persons are jointly charged with negligence.

Ap-
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plicability of the doctrine destroys the possibility of two
per~on~ being responsible for the injury.
A~s.nmiug, vvithout admitting, that the pipes beneath
the L'ottnges were under the control of the Motor Park,
how can the doctrine of res ips~a loquitur apply in the
a1bsence of some evidence that the pipes broke and gave
off the gas that exploded"?

The mere fact that Instruction No. 5 was requested
as an alternate in the event the court refused to give
instruction No. 2 has no bearing upon this question.
That defendant accepted less than it was entitled to does
not stop it from assigning error for failure of the court
to give it all that it \Yas entitled to. It certainly needs
no citation of authorities upon this subject.
III.
DID THE COURT IDRR IN REPEATEDLY ASSUMING AND STATING
TO THE JURY IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE SYSTEM
OF PIPES WITHIN THE MOTOR PARK WAS DEFECTIVE,
LEAKING; AND THAT GAS WAS ESCAPING THEREFROM,
AND THAT THE GAS WHICH CAUSED THE EXPLOSION
AND INJURY TO PLAINTIFF CAME FROM DEFECTIVE OR
LEAKING PIPES?

The fact that these instructions were given at the
request of the Gas Company instead of plaintiff does
not make them any the less erroneous and prejudicial
to defendant Motor Park.

The trial court's attention

was .ealled to this error but it was not corrected.

The
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fact that couns·el for respondent has read the instructions carefully and cannot find any such assumption, or
any language from which such assumption can be inferred, does not delete these statements and assumptions
from the instructions.
Respondent's entire brief is based upon the assumption that the gas pipes beneath the Loos cottage had been
leaking, and that the gas which exploded came from
that s·ouree. H·e states on page ·21 in connection with
his argument relating to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
''In no other way may the verdict, under the instructions
given, be explained", ref erring to this very assumption.
This ·statement amply deri:wnstrates the magnitude of
that particular issue in the case. If that was the paramount and maj.or issue, then it certainly was erroneous
a.nd prejudicial for the court to have assumed those facts
repeatedly in instructing the jury.
Not only did counsel for respondent ha·se his entire
case at the trial upon that assumption, but he has repeated the error in his brief on appeal, and the trial
court grievously erred, to the prejudice of defendant,
in ·making the same assumptions in its instructions.

IV.
DID THE COURT ERR IN HOLDING THE MOTOR PARK TO THE
SAME DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY AS THE GAS COMpANY AS A SUPPLIER OF GAS?

Respondent makes the following statement 1n discussing this point:
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·'The :Jiotor Park n1ay have been a consumer,
as between it and the Gas Company, and entitled
to care commensurate with the inherent dangerous character of gas, but as to the plaintiff it
is to be charged \Vi th the same degree of care.''
That is exaettly \d1ere counsel for respondent is in
error. Two parties may be jointly chargeable with negligence. One may be held to a high degree of ,care a.s a
dealer -or handler of a dangerous commodity. The other
may be chargeable with negligence in failing 'to use
ordinary care, or for technical violation of a.n ordinance
or statute. It is the duty of the trial court in its instructions to the jury to state the degree of care required of
each separately. In the Clase at bar the trial oourt erroneously threw the Motor Park (a customer or consumer) into the category of a public utility or dealer in
gas.
The Motor Park was no more a. dealer or handler
of a dangerous agency than the Wheelers, Loos, Bussells
or any other customer. A landlord equips the premiseB
for the supplying of gas by the gas company to its
tenants, but the gas company sells the gas and the
tenant operates it. A landlord may be chargeable for
failure to correct a structural defect if it has an opportunity so to do, but this does not warrant an instruction
making the landlord a seller or dealer.
It was the duty of the trial court to segregate its
instructions as to the two defendants because the defendant Motor Park did not as a customer or consumer
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occupy the .same position as the Gas Company, whose
it was to handle and deal with the agency which,
under the uncontradieted evidence, causP.n the explosion.
As was said in the case of S1awyer v. Sovuthern California
Gas Company, 274 Pac. 544:
bus~ness

''Gas companies as manufacturers and distributors of a highly explosive and inflammable
substance, possess technical knowledge of the dangers to be guarded against in handling or installing gas appliances for illuminwting and commereial
purposes fa,r beyond t1he knowledge possessed by
the avera1f}e person."
As to the re.maining assignments of error defendant
M·otor Park submits them upon the brief heretofore
presented.
Respe.ctfully submitted,
RICH, RiiCH

&

S:rRONG,

Attorneys for Defendant,
Utah Motor Pa1rk, Inc.
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